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Abstract
We  set  up  an  analytical  framework  focusing  on the  problem  of  interaction  over  time  when 
economic agents are characterized by various types of distributional social preferences. We develop 
an  evolutionary  approach  in  which  individual  preferences  are  endogenous  and  account  for  the 
evolution of  cooperation when  all the players are initially  entirely selfish.  In particular, within 
motivationally  heterogeneous  agents  embedded  in  a  social  network,  we  adopt  a  variant  of  the 
indirect evolutionary approach, where material payoffs play a critical role, and assume that a co-
evolutionary  process  occurs  in  which  subjective  preferences  gradually  evolve  due  to  a  key 
mechanism involving behavioral choices, relational intensity and degree of social openness. The 
simulations we carried out led to strongly consistent results with regard to the evolution of player 
types,  the  dynamics  of  material  payoffs,  the  creation  of  significant  interpersonal relationships 
among agents and the frequency of cooperation. In the long run, cooperation turns out to be the 
strategic choice that obtains the best performances, in terms of material payoffs, and ‘nice guys’, far 
from finishing last, succeed in coming out ahead.
JEL Classification: B41; C73; D74; Z13.
Keywords: Behavioral  Economics;  Cooperation;  Prisoner’s  Dilemma;  Social  Evolution; 
Heterogeneous Social Preferences; Indirect Evolutionary Approach
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“To a large extent, experiences and events of the past causally affect 
the choices made by human individuals. Rational choice theory, while 
assigning expectations of the future to their proper role in models of 
social  phenomena,  must  somehow  incorporate  the  fact  that  choice 
behavior is not exclusively drawn from the ‘front’ but is also pushed 
from the ‘rear’” (Gueth and Kliemt, 1998; p. 378 – italics added)
1. Introduction
The evolution of cooperation has been extensively studied in the last decades in the social 
sciences.  Well-known  explanatory mechanisms  now  include  reputation formation,  kin  selection 
(Hamilton, 1964), direct reciprocity (Trivers, 1971; Axelrod, 1984) and indirect reciprocity and 
costly signalling (Nowak and Sigmund, 1998; Gintis et al., 2001). However, despite the relevance 
of the above explanations, the emergence and sustainability of cooperation is still a major puzzle, 
insofar as we refer to large-scale societies in which agents are genetically unrelated and interaction 
is decentralized and increasingly anonymous. How can cooperation be endogenously enforced and 
be stable over time within such social environments, when clear material incentives to act selfishly 
exist  and  exogenous  enforcement  mechanisms  are  unavailable?  With  regard  to  these  contexts, 
recent approaches identify solutions such as the possibility of non-participation (see Kurzban and 
Houser, 2004, among others) and the presence of an implicit social contract prescribing cooperation 
on the part of (homogeneous) self-interested individuals (Benchekroun and Long, 2007). Janssen 
(2006) explains cooperation among genetically unrelated people by referring to players’ ability to 
recognize  untrustworthy  opponents.  He  uses  simulation  experiments  with  artificial  agents  and 
shows  that  evolution  of  cooperation  can  occur when  agents  are  able  to learn  to  recognize  the 
trustworthiness of other individuals. 
In order to provide a satisfactory answer to the ‘puzzle of cooperation’, a different line of 
thought is increasingly gaining ground at both theoretical and empirical level and today a large 
body  of  experimental  evidence  suggests  a  broadening  of  the  traditional  framework  of  homo 
oeconomicus conveyed by the rational choice paradigm and centred about the established category 
of material self-interest (see e.g. Mueller, 1986). The role of this crucial assumption in economic 
theory has aroused extensive debate again and again in the history of the discipline as well as 
among philosophers interested in the methodological foundations of economic science. In the last 
decades, a lot of economic experiments have persuasively shown that the so called ‘selfishness 
axiom’ turns out to be often violated by subjects’ actual behavior. If we followed the basic rational 
choice theory prescriptions, admitting that universal egoism is the rule, how could we then explain 
why non-opportunistic behaviors often survive, both in the lab and in relevant real-life domains? 
Why do people give to charities? Why are individuals often willing to incur costs in order to reward 
kindness and punish unkindness? What is the reason why cooperative actions often take place in 
interactive environments within which no monetary incentives to do so are at work?
In an attempt to give account of such growing body of evidence about seemingly ‘irrational’ 
behaviors, a new explanatory road has been taken, laying stress on the complexity of human nature 
and the variety of human goals and motives. The endeavor is to show that there is no founded 
reason to confine economics exclusively to agents pursuing strictly material satisfactions leaving 
out of consideration any kind of moral imperatives and restraints. As Sen (1987) clearly remarked, 
“Universal selfishness as actuality may well be false, but universal selfishness as a requirement of 
rationality  is  patently  absurd”.  In  particular,  as  far  as  experimental  studies  on  cooperation  are 4
concerned,  behavioral  economists’  main  contribution  has  been  to  show  that  a  lot  of  behavior 
observed  in  the  lab  is  compatible  with  the  idea  that  subjects  are  driven  by  so  called  ‘social 
preferences’ (see Fehr and Gaechter, 2000 and Camerer, 2003), that is individual preferences with a 
social content capturing “the phenomena that people seem to care about certain ‘social’ goals, such 
as the well-being of other individuals or a ‘fair’ allocation among members in society, in addition to 
their own benefits” (Li, 2006; p. 1). 
However, with regard to nonselfish behavior, a key question remains largely unanswered, up 
to now: where do so called ‘social preferences’ come from? How can we evolutionarily justify their 
emergence,  within  significant  social  interaction  scenarios?  In  other  words,  it  is  important  to 
understand whether it is true or not that selective incentives actually play against individuals who 
pay attention to other people’s well-being and that therefore these motivational types should sooner 
or later disappear in any specific economic or social environment in which they occasionally play a 
role. In this regard, unlike what many theorists claim by endorsing such ‘naïve evolutionary view’, 
we  defend  the  alternative  thesis  that  selective  incentives  need  not  always  favor  self-interested 
individuals  at  the  expenses  of  nonselfish  ones.  In  particular,  we  claim  that  analyzing  the 
implications of other-regarding preferences seems is one of the most promising routes along the 
path indicated above. Notwithstanding this, it is crucial, in addressing such an issue, to go beyond 
the simple identification of altruism with some versions of what has been framed as ‘enlightened 
egoism’, as if it were theoretically necessary to assume that some unconscious motive (say, self-
esteem  or  status-seeking  motivations)  or  genetic  force  (a  ‘selfish  gene’)  is  at  work  in  driving 
individual behavior. These behavioral patterns are of course plausible and interesting in themselves, 
but it would be questionable to identify such individualistic motivational set as exhaustive with 
respect to the problem of the existence of other-regarding behavior. We must admit, at least in 
principle, that not all seemingly altruistic behavior underlies egoistic motivations, i.e. that the desire 
to help others can be nonstrategically motivated and inspire costly voluntary behavior without any 
expectation of present or future material rewards (see on this Fehr and Gaechter, 2000; Camerer, 
2003).   
In this paper, we focus on a population where players are (potentially) driven by different 
types of social preferences and address the issue of cooperation by providing a solution based on a 
novel  enforcement  mechanism:  a  co-evolutionary process  involving  subjective  preferences  and 
behavioral choices, crucially depending on the material consequences of social interaction, along 
the lines of the so called ‘Indirect Evolutionary Approach’ (IEA; see on this Gueth and Yaari, 
1992). Our major goal is to see whether the above mechanism turns out to be a powerful device for 
the  emergence  of  cooperative  behaviors  among  (initially  selfish)  strangers
1.  In  particular,  we 
assume that players are driven by distributional social preferences, that is preferences over final 
payoff allocations, but that a significant degree of player type heterogeneity exists. Several studies 
suggest that heterogeneity as to player types is a promising direction to shed light on the issue of 
cooperation.  Erlei  (2006)  presents  a  simple  model  based  on  heterogeneous  other-regarding 
preferences that turns out to have a high predictive accuracy, with regard to experimental evidence. 
Rotemberg (2007) shows that heterogeneous social preferences can account for the experimental 
results of ultimatum and dictator games. We carry out a simulatory analysis on a heterogeneous 
population in which different ‘experimentally focal’ types are simultaneously considered, and show 
that, despite the presence of relevant material incentives to defect, cooperation is a stable medium-
run outcome
2. Our major finding is that the analytical combination of endogenous sociality and 
heterogeneity provides us with a novel account for the emergence of cooperation when material 
                                                          
1 Like  Janssen  (2006),  we  set  up  a  simulatory  experiment  and  find  conditions  under  which  a  population  initially 
dominated  by  selfish  individuals choosing  to  defect  evolves  towards  a  population  in  which  both  a  high  level  of 
cooperation and other-regarding preferences prevail.
2 For a recent paper where cooperation results from a trade-off between material incentives and individual values, see 
Tabellini (2008).5
incentives to free ride are present and exogenous enforcement devices are not available. Further, we 
obtain analogous results within a social environment in which material payoffs play a critical role in 
making preferences endogenous and assortative matchings occur, with the probability of meeting a 
given player depending on the degree of relational intensity characterizing such interaction.
The structure of the remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the analytical 
model. Section 3 contains the major results of the different simulations we carried out. Section 4 
concludes.
2. The structure of the game   
We explore the emergence and sustainability of cooperation among (initially fully) selfish 
players, within a large-scale population where agents are randomly matched in pairs
3. As far as 
pairwise interactions are concerned, the basic game-theoretic framework is given by the established 
material Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) setting
4. If we consider the infinitely repeated PD, Rubinstein 
(1986),  by  studying  two-person  supergames  where  each  player  is  restricted  to  carry  out  his 
strategies by finite automata, makes clear that cooperation cannot be the outcome of a solution to 
this game. However, Axelrod (1984) succeeds in providing precise conditions for this to happen 
and, unlike several contributions on the theme, he manages to do this without altering the very 
nature of the interaction problem
5. Similarly, Oltra and Schenk (1996) investigate the evolution of 
cooperation  in  a  simulation  model  where  (selfish)  agents  play  a  one-shot  Prisoner’s  Dilemma 
against their neighbors. Here they show that cooperation can persist and spread over in the long run 
insofar  as  agents  choose  their  strategies  according  to  imitation  rules  and  the  neighborhood 
structures they are located in overlap. Unlike these interesting contributions, in the basic version of 
the  model  we  attempt  to  go  beyond  the  ‘dilemma’  without  altering  players’  strategy  set  or 
neighborhood  structure,  by  focusing  instead  on  the  role  of  motivational  and  relational  factors, 
within  an  evolutionary  framework:  in  particular,  our  purpose  is  to  set  up  a  model  where,  at 
individual level, agents are (i) potentially nonselfish and (ii) allowed to gradually strengthen or 
weaken mutual relationships, as time unfolds. Our major goal is to study such analytical structure 
with  reference  to  a  motivationally  complex  population  composed  of  heterogeneous agents  (see 
Section 2.2.), in order to investigate whether and under what conditions cooperation may emerge as 
a stable outcome within such a broader and more realistic scenario.    
Let  us  consider  the  following  bimatrix,  containing  players’  material  payoffs  in 




C 2 , 2 0 , 3
D 3 , 0 1 , 1
                                                          
3 Frameworks in which trading environments are populated by a large number of agents who meet randomly have been 
recently studied, among others, by Camera and Casari (2007).
4 In the one-shot material PD, the Pareto-efficient solution, that is Mutual Cooperation (MC), is unable to endogenously 
emerge insofar as the two agents are assumed to be driven by classic selfish preferences. Cooperation here is a strictly 
dominated strategy: at the individual level, it is in the interest of each agent to defect, independently of the opponent’s 
strategy. This well-known ‘unpleasant’ result holds even if the game is repeated a finite number of times, insofar as 
agents are egoists and we apply the standard ‘backward induction’ reasoning (see Luce and Raiffa, 1956). 
5 In particular, by referring to the well-known ‘tit for tat’ strategy, he shows that in a world of egoists in which no 
exogenous central authority exists and where an initial cluster of agents rely on reciprocity, MC may be able to emerge.6
Table 1. Material  Prisoner’s Dilemma
The  game  continues  for  a  finite  number  of  periods.  Hence,  the  only  Subgame  Perfect  Nash 
equilibrium is Mutual Defection (MD). 
The  first  distinctive feature of  the model  is given by the  following  mechanism,  linking 
behavioral and  relational dimension  at  individual  level:  we  assume  that,  as  a  consequence  of 
repeated  interaction,  the  interpersonal  relationship  between  two  specific  players,  say  A  and B, 
develops over time and can be formally captured by means of the ‘degree of relational intensity’ IR, 
which evolves in a discrete way on the basis of individuals’ strategic choices. In particular, IRAB
increases (resp., decreases) in period t if A observes that in the previous stage of the game (t-1) 
player B made the same (a different) strategic choice as her, i.e. whenever A observes that either 
MC or MD occurred at t-1. The rationale behind the introduction of such a mechanism has to do 
with the substantial evidence available today with regard to the existence of a specific mechanism 
connecting the perceived similarity of behavioral choices with the degree of empathy emerging at 
interpersonal level
6. Neuroscientific evidence increasingly shows that empathy is a key source of 
pro-sociality  (see  Singer  and  Fehr,  2005).  As  Adam  Smith  (1759;  pp. 9-10)  authoritatively 
observed: “When we see a stroke aimed and just ready to fall upon the leg or arm of another person, 
we naturally shrink and draw back our own leg or own arm; and when it does fall, we feel it in some 
measure, and are hurt by it as well as the sufferer”.
2.1. The dynamics of cooperation with other-regarding preferences: empathic altruism
In order to make clear how the mechanism illustrated above works, let us start with the 
simple  case  involving  interactions  between  two motivationally  homogeneous  players  driven  by 
genuinely other-regarding preferences. Hence, let us suppose that A and B’s (symmetric) utility 
functions are: 
UA = (1-wAB)*A + wAB*B                                                                 (1)                      
UB = (1-wBA)*B + wBA*A                                                                    (2)
where the parameter of sociality w denotes the degree of altruism of each individual (0  w < 1). In 
this case, both A and B can be said to be ‘partial altruists’, as “between the frozen pole of egoism 
and the tropical expanse of  utilitarianism (there is)…  the position of one for  whom in a calm 
moment his neighbour’s utility compared with his own neither counts for nothing, nor “counts for 
one”, but counts for a fraction” (Edgeworth, 1881)
7. However, far from adopting a static view of 
altruism, we believe that it is important to develop a ‘relational’ perspective, that is to analyze 
                                                          
6 In this regard, Hoffman (1995) remarks that, in the context of Krebs’ experiments, “Subjects who were told that they 
were similar to the other, as compared to those told that they were dissimilar, gave more pronounced physiological 
responses when the other appeared to be experiencing pleasure or pain, reported that they identified more with the other, 
felt worse while the other waited to receive an electric shock, and were more likely to behave altruistically toward the 
other. This finding has special interest since, as noted earlier, the physiological response to another’s distress appears to 
have a large involuntary component” (p. 22 – italics added). 
7 For a similar formalization, see Ledyard (1995). Levine’s (1998) specification of altruistic preferences coincides with 
ours when he assumes that players have the same regard for altruistic and spiteful opponents. Janssen (2006), in his 
simulation experiment, assumes that players are driven by social-welfare preferences: they always prefer more for 
themselves and the other player (like partial altruists), but are more in favor of getting payoffs for themselves when they 
are behind than when they are ahead.7
other-regarding preferences within a dynamic framework which driving their evolution over time: 
with reference to the extensive debate mentioned in Section 1, it is of interest to verify whether and 
under what  conditions non-standard  preferences are  sufficient  to  bring about  the emergence  of 
stable cooperative solutions which enable ‘nice guys’, far from finishing last, to come out ahead. 
Hence, we assume that the degree of altruism is not a fixed stock but depends, in turn, on the level 
of interpersonal relational intensity IR. This dependence is captured by the following functional 
form:
wA = IRAB / (IRAB + b)              (where b   +; f' >0 e f''<0)                        (3)
The different values of the parameter b bring about different possible time paths, provided that we 
assume a similar behavior of the players in all the periods
8:
T 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
IR 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
w (b=3) 0 0,25 0,4 0,5 0,57 0,62 0,67 0,7 0,72 0,75 0,77
w (b=9) 0 0,1 0,18 0,25 0,3 0,35 0,4 0,44 0,47 0,5 0,52
Table 2. Time Path of IR and w
Further, we assume that in each period each agent chooses between C and D on the basis of a 
simple  expected  utility  calculation  and  believes,  in  the  light  of  adaptive  expectations,  that  his 
opponent makes, at time t, the same strategic choice chosen at time t - 1. We chose to adopt this 
assumption, which works against the emergence of cooperation, in order to avoid any speculation 
of the players on the opponent’s future behavior. That means that a cooperation’s strategic choice 
cannot be instrumentally used in order to influence opponent’s relational intensities and, therefore, 
the sociality parameter.  
When the game starts (t = 0), since the agents are supposed not to know one another, we assume 
that IRAB=IRBA=0, which implies that wAB = wBA = 0. The related utility functions are:
UA = A                       
UB = B
Therefore, at t = 0 both players defect
9. However, in the light of their (potentially) altruistic utility 
functions, at t = 1 both players will start assigning a positive weight to their opponent’s payoff, as in 
t = 1, IR = 1. In order to find out the exact stage of the game where the strategic change occurs, it is 
sufficient to calculate the value of w such that, say, for A the (expected) utility associated with 
cooperation (C) turns out to be greater than the level of utility generated by defection (D):
                                                          
8 Our formalization implies that altruism depends positively on relational intensity, but after a certain number of periods 
this takes place in a less than proportional way.  
9 At t = 0, it is as if both A and B, who do not know each other, were standard selfish agents. Hence, they both defect as
defection is the dominant strategy in the standard one-shot PD setting.8
UA(A c / B d )= (1-wAB)*0 + wAB*3
UA(A d / B d )= (1-wBA)*1 + wBA*1
Therefore, A will change his strategic choice when UA(A c / B d )  UA(A d / B d ), that is when
3*w  1      w  1/3
and, substituting this critical threshold value for w in (3), we get:
IR  b/2.
From t = b/2 onwards, both agents will continue to play C: therefore, the degree of interpersonal 
relational intensity IR will grow more and more as time unfolds.
        Hence, since partial altruism, far from being a fixed stock, evolves depending on the degree of 
relational intensity, we may characterize it as ‘empathic altruism’. Empathy can be seen as “the 
ability to share the emotions of another person, and to understand that person’s point of view” 
(Eysenck, 2000). Since altruism depends on the capacity to regard oneself as one individual among 
many, empathically-driven motivational types can be characterized as players who perceive what 
happens to others as if they were themselves involved in the situation. Several contributions have 
shown, mainly on the basis of psychological and biological reflections, that a significant correlation 
exists between perception of a person’s distress and tendency to respond empathically through an 
overt helping act,  that is to  behave altruistically (e.g.  Bateson,  1987; Hoffman,  1995). In  their 
experimental analysis, Stahl and Haruvy (2006) also focus on the presence of empathy in the lab. 
They define empathy as follows: “since each participant is most likely a recipient rather than a 
dictator, the participant identifies with the recipient, invoking other-regarding preferences which 
otherwise might have been latent” (p. 28). Hence, their empathy hypothesis assumes that the weight 
assigned to other agents’ monetary payoffs increases with the probability that you may be a passive 
recipient and they find that this empathy-altruism mechanism can explain the giving behavior in one 
of the experiments they run. In our work, empathy is triggered by sameness and, in turn, triggers 
altruism.  Then, if  the degree  of  altruism becomes sufficiently  large, it may induce  cooperative 
behaviors. This is the key mechanism at work whenever we assume that two altruists interact over 
time  within  a  material  PD  framework.  The  empathic  altruist  differs  from  both  the  so  called 
‘communitarian altruist’ and the ‘universal altruist’: unlike the former, whose main feature is a 
selective attitude towards other people depending on their being embedded or not in his pre-formed 
social  network,  this  motivational  type  selects  others  on  the  basis  of  direct social  interaction, 
whereas he differs from the latter because of the key role played by his selective attitude towards 
others. Such behavior is likely to act as a good explanation of altruistic phenomena emerging within 
large groups, in which people do not know each other personally before social interaction occurs. 
The same qualitative conclusion can be reached if we refer to a different functional form for UA
and UB, assuming that both agents are not partial altruists, but are driven by ‘Benthamite Altruism’, 
in the sense that they care not only about their own payoff but also, in a traditional Benthamite 
fashion, about the sum of individual payoffs
10. 
                                                          
10 Charness and Rabin (2002) focus on social welfare preferences characterized by agents who assign positive weight to 
aggregated surplus: other things being equal, the level of utility of an individual driven by such preferences increases if 
other agents are better off. They carried out 32 experiments and, by comparing several social preference approaches 
with the data, showed that social welfare preferences are better able to account for behavior in the experimental games.9
The (linear) utility functions in this second case are:
UA = (1-wAB)*A + wAB*(A + B )            (4)                      
UB = (1-wBA)*B + wBA*(B + A )           (5)
It is straightforward to  see that mutual cooperation (MC) arises  here when t > b: now for the 
emergence of cooperation it takes twice the time required in the previous case. This difference can 
be easily accounted for by referring to players’ utility functions; however, in both cases we notice 
that the larger is b, the greater is the level of t necessary for MC to endogenously emerge.
2.2. Motivationally heterogeneous players
In this section, in the light of the above analysis, we address the following question: what 
happens when we focus on motivationally heterogeneous populations? What about considering a 
more realistic world in which the previously illustrated co-evolutionary mechanism is supposed to 
be  at  work?  Erlei  (2006)  interestingly  remarks:  “The  overall  impression  is  that  the  analytical 
combination of social preferences with heterogeneity in these preferences is a very productive way 
of understanding real behavior in laboratory experiments” (p. 21). Social preferences exhibit many 
patterns:  reciprocally  motivated  players  tend  to  display  (seemingly  irrational)  nonstrategic 
punishment, often – though not exclusively – targeted towards defectors (see on this e.g. Fehr and 
Gaechter, 2000). As Erlei (2006) correctly observes, the growing behavioral economics literature on 
social  preferences  can  be  divided  into  three  relevant  substrands:  theories  of  intention-based 
reciprocity (Rabin, 1993; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006), theories based on inequity aversion (Bolton 
and  Ockenfels,  2000;  Fehr  and  Schmidt,  1999)  and  models  centered  around  social  welfare 
preferences  (Andreoni  and  Miller,  2002;  Charness  and  Rabin,  2002).  In  line  with  Erlei,  our 
modelling strategy in this paper is very close to the latter two theories, in which social concerns are 
outcome-based and have to do with distributional issues, rather than with an evaluation  of the 
opponent’s intentions
11.
However,  it  appears  sensitive  to  suppose  that  sociality  may  affect  agents’  utility  either 
positively or negatively. This is confirmed by experiments on unselfish behaviors, showing that 
people are both willing to help others, caring about the others’ material well-being or to be kind 
towards  those  who  are  kind  (and  such  behaviors  are  often  formalized  through  pro-social
preferences such as altruism, inequity aversion or positive reciprocity) and unhappy if the opponent 
is better off, to be mean towards those who are mean or willing to explicitly punish others (and such 
behaviors are often formalized through competitive, anti-social preferences such as spitefulness, 
envy or negative reciprocity; see e.g. Fehr and Gaechter (2000) and Camerer (2003)). Levine (1998) 
correctly observes that while it appears plausible to suppose that people care not only about their 
own monetary payoffs, but also about their opponents’ ones, it is not clear whether the coefficient 
on the other player’s payoffs should be positive or negative: public good games seem to suggest that 
it is positive, but data about the well-known ultimatum game protocol indicate that it is negative (as 
positive offers are often rejected). As he does, we also assume that the coefficient differs between 
                                                          
11 Levine (1998) adopts a somewhat intermediate point of view: while on the whole his approach is very close to 
distributional  social  preference theories,  he  elaborates  a  signalling  game  in  which  players’  weights  on  opponents’ 
monetary payoffs depend both on their own coefficient of altruism (or spite) and – in the spirit of psychological game 
theory (see Geanakoplos et al., 1989 and Rabin, 1993) – on what they believe their opponents’ coefficients to be.10
different agents in the population, with some players having positive coefficients and others having 
negative coefficients. Like Levine (1998), we further assume that each individual’s coefficient is 
private information
12. In our analysis, we assume that all the players’ payoffs are linear in their own 
monetary income and their opponents’, in the sense that all of them, albeit being motivationally 
heterogeneous, assign a positive relative weight (1-w) to their own material well-being and, under 
certain conditions, a positive relative weight (w) to either the opponent’s material well-being or to 
the sum or the difference between their own and their opponent’s material well-being. The latter 
component  captures  the  distributional nature  of  their  (either  pro- or  anti-)  social  preferences. 
Clearly, within this broader context, the parameter w will have to be interpreted as the degree of 
‘social  influence’, that  is as  the preference parameter characterizing the  content of each  type’s 
distributional  social  preferences.  This  parameter captures  the  relative  strength  of  distributive 
concerns  compared  to  the  purely  individualistic  ones  and  we  assume  that  a  certain  degree  of 
motivational heterogeneity exists with regard to the component that, within the utility function of a 
given type of players, multiplies such key ‘parameter of sociality’ w.
In the light of this, by using Matlab we have elaborated a simulation programme focusing on 
a heterogeneous population where six types of  players driven by linear objective  functions are 
considered. Motivational heterogeneity exists as our economy is populated by six player types, 
where three types of agents are driven by other-regarding preferences and three types are motivated 
by self-centered preferences. More specifically, while, as far as unselfish players are concerned, w 
multiplies  either  their  opponent’s  well-being  (Partial  Altruism  and,  under  certain  conditions, 
Rawlsian Altruism) or the sum of their own and their opponent’s well-being (Benthamite Altruism), 
other  players  are  supposed  to  be  driven  by  anti-social  preferences:  for  them,  w  weighs  the 
difference between their own and their opponent’s well-being (Inequity Loving Egoism), at least 
under some conditions (Spiteful Egoism). Finally, some individuals are simply driven by classic 
self-regarding preferences (Pure Egoists), so that w = 0 for them.
Formally, our six player types’ utility functions are as follows:
Partial Altruist:                  Ui = (1-wij)*ij  +  wij*ji
Benthamite Altruist:            Ui = (1-wij)* ij + wij*(ji + ij)  
Rawlsian Altruist:               Ui = (1-wij)* ij + wij* Ri        
      with  Ri =  j                             if  i≥ j
       = i                                                 if  i < j
Pure Egoist:                        Ui = ij
Inequity Loving Egoist:       Ui = (1-wij)* ij + wij*( ij -ji)
Spiteful Egoist:                    Ui = (1-wij)* ij + wij* Pi     
            with  Pi =  i                                  if  i  j
       =  i - j                           if  i  j
Beyond Pure Egoism, Partial Altruism
13 and Benthamite Altruism (whose basic features 
have  been  illustrated  in  the  previous  sections),  we  have  decided  to  introduce  three  further 
                                                          
12 As we clarify below, we suppose that a single player is informed about what his opponent has chosen to do in the 
previous interaction they had, but neither player knows what the opponent’s type is.
13 Both Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999) assume that agents dislike inequality and are willing 
to sacrifice money in order to reduce it. As Erlei (2006) interestingly observes, both concepts of aversion to inequality 11
motivational structures in the population, so that it can be seen as more descriptively realistic: a 
Rawlsian Altruist assigns a positive weight to his opponent’s payoff, but only insofar as the other 
player is either equal or worse off than him; an Inequity Loving Egoist is mainly interested in 
maximizing the ‘degree of inequality’ (formally expressed, here, by the difference between his own 
and  his  opponent’s  payoff);  finally,  the  Spiteful  Egoist’s  major  feature  is  given  by  his  being 
negatively affected by the difference between his own and his opponent’s payoff, but only as far as 
he turns out to be worse off than his opponent. Hence,  we also consider two types of players 
exhibiting  competitive preferences, in  the sense that  both Inequity Loving and  Spiteful  Egoists 
positively weigh the opponents’ negative payoffs
14.
Regarding Rawlsian Altruism, it is important to make clear that here we refer more to a 
recent and widely used interpretation of Rawls’ maximin criterion rather than to Rawls’ original 
idea  itself,  as  the  former  is  amenable  to  explicit  game-theoretic  treatment.  In  particular,  with 
reference to such well-known mathematical formalization of Rawls’ maximin, Alexander (1974) 
argues that such a concept, contrary to Rawls’ claim, does not imply a complete departure from the 
standard utilitarian (Benthamite) framework; rather, the Benthamite and the Rawlsian criteria can 
be embedded into a common one-parameter family of welfare functions indexed by the relative 
weight assigned to individual utilities. This mathematical characterization of maximin allows one to 
consider  a  continuum of  motivational  structures  placing  different  weights  upon  distributional 
concerns,  of  which  maximin and Benthamite  utilitarianism  are  but  two focal  points.  As  far  as 
Inequality Loving Egoists are concerned, it is worth observing that while including such agents 
within the population under study may sound extravagant at first glance, their presence is far from 
implausible: such a motivational force seems to be commonly at work in all the societies where the 
very poor not only tolerate, but actively support the luxury of a small elite. We can interpret this as 
a ‘preference for inequality’ or as the implementation of a norm of elitarianism. Finally, Spiteful 
Egoism refers to those people who – far from being neutral towards other people’s well-being –
enjoy negative psychological externalities from the interaction with opponents getting an equal or 
larger material payoff
15: here, these individuals are standard selfish agents whenever they are better 
off than their opponent, but are negatively affected by the difference between their opponent’s and 
their own material payoff whenever they are worse off
16.
By including such motivational types within the overall framework, we create room for a 
potentially  interesting  comparison  between  the  performance,  at  dynamic  level,  of  (Inequality 
Loving and Spiteful) anti-social agents and (Rawlsian and Benthamite) pro-social individuals
17. 
With  respect  to  these  ‘extreme’  figures,  Pure  Egoists  are  somehow  in  the  middle,  concerning 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
have  been  extremely  successful  in  describing  laboratory  behavior  when  they  assume  heterogeneous actors.  With 
reference to Fehr and Schmidt’s specification of inequity aversion, it is easy to show that if we assume that the degree 
of aversion to unfavorable inequalities coincides with the degree of aversion to favorable inequalities, their objective 
function becomes very close to our formalization of partial altruism.
14 It  easy  to  notice  that  in  such  a  society  cooperation  cannot  become  the  only  strategic  choice  made  within  the 
population due to the presence of agents that will systematically defect independently of the levels of both relational 
intensity and w
15 For an interesting study on positionality, see Hirsch (1976).
16 The main  difference  between  these two  player  types  driven  by competitive  preferences is that while Inequality 
Loving individuals are happier the larger is the degree of inequality between them and their opponent, regardless of 
their relative position compared to the opponent’s one, the opposite occurs with regard to Spiteful Egoists: such players’ 
utility decreases as their relative position worsens – compared to the opponent’s one.
17 Hence, it should be clear that we are not interested in Rawlsian (or Benthamite) social welfare theory per se; this is 
why we claim it is methodologically consistent to formally characterize Rawlsian players even though this is not what 
Rawls himself does. In other words, rather than taking an orthodox Rawlsian (or Benthamite, or Nietzschean, with 
regard to Inequity Loving players) perspective, we purposely construct some ‘new’, stylized motivational structures in 
order to see whether, in what cases, and under what conditions they can help to improve the implementable social 
outcome, once they are adopted within a complex population of heterogeneous agents.12
exclusively  (and  ‘coldly’)  about  their  own  material  well-being  and  totally  disregarding  the 
opponent’s material payoffs.
3. Results
Before illustrating our main results, it is important to make clear that, with regard to the 
multi-player population under study, we introduce the following assumption, making the overall 
social environment even more ‘hostile’ to the emergence of cooperation. More specifically, unlike 
the analysis developed in Section 2 (regarding two-player populations only), we now suppose that, 
as far as pairwise matchings are concerned, whenever both individuals play D, each agent’s level of 
relational intensity IR increases by one unit with probability h and keeps constant with probability 
1-h. This stochastic element is likely to better capture the uncertain nature of the dynamics of 
human relations within complex societies, as it is reasonable to argue that it is often difficult to infer 
individuals’ real intentions by simply observing their behavioral choices. In particular, it seems 
reasonable  to  think  that,  within  a  multi-player  population,  when  a  player’s  specific opponent 
defects, it is not easy for her to understand whether such behavior underlies ‘bad’ intentions towards 
her (i.e. an attempt of exploitation) or not
18. It is important to recall that players are aware that they 
play a material PD whenever they meet another player, but also that the overall population is far 
larger than a two-player society in which the PD is ‘the’ overall game. We argue that this makes 
their interpretation of a mutual defection outcome different: if my opponent defects when I defect, 
this does not imply that he wants to be mean towards me, as we both know that we are part of a far 
larger society. In other words, I may see him as a ‘free rider’ towards society as a whole, rather than 
as a person who is trying to exploit me specifically. Hence, this similarity may well induce an 
increase in the level of the agent’s ‘parameter of sociality’ w, that is his ‘degree of social influence’, 
regardless of the specific content of the player’s distributional preferences
19. Moreover, in order to 
not to favor, a priori, the emergence of cooperation, we rule out the possibility of mixed strategies: 
more specifically, we assume whenever agents are indifferent between the two strategies, they will 
defect.
The simulation has been carried out on a population of 60 agents. In the results we present, 
for expositional reasons, we forced the initial population to be composed by an equal number of all 
the types of the agents. Our main results hold also with a different distribution of population’s 
agents. Parameters b, w and h have been kept constant, so that they did not affect the dynamics of 
the game. In particular, we have set b = 4.1
20 and h = 0.5. We also assume that whenever IR is 
negative w=0. The simulation is composed of 10.000 pair interactions (‘row agent’ versus ‘column 
agent’) and provides a matrix of strategies (called ‘S’), a matrix of relational intensities (‘IR’) and a 
matrix for the levels of the social openness parameter w (‘W’).
The  results  illustrate what  happens in the social scenario where different  motivationally 
agents are involved. All the tables show the results emerging when the agent ‘row’ meets the agent 
                                                          
18 Experimental economics has been increasingly showing the relevance of (one’s opponent’s) intention evaluation in 
motivating people’s behavior (even when giving importance to intentions is materially costly). See on this Falk and 
Fischbacher, 2006. 
19 Also Tabellini (2008) in one of the versions of his model on the scope of cooperation assumes that individuals get a 
non-economic, psychological cost from defecting only if the opponent cooperates, but not if both players cheat. This is 
similar in spirit to our assumption that if two players cheat, then the level of relational intensity may increase.
20 We have chosen  not  to  use an integer  number  in  order  to avoid problems  of indeterminacy with  w,  as such a 
parameter is related to IR through the expression w = IR/(IR+b).13
‘column’. They represent the spread of cooperation among the 6 types of agents (Figure 1), the 
evolution of IR (Figure 2) and the evolution of W (Figure 3) over time, respectively.
Figure 1. Final frequency of cooperation
Result 1. Mutual cooperation stably emerges among Partial Altruists, Benthamite Altruists and 
between them
As far as players driven by pro-social preferences are concerned, we see that when Partial 
Altruists interact with one another, cooperation becomes the unique strategy (fig 1) and the values 
of IR and W are very large (fig 2 and 3). The same is true with reference to Benthamite Altruists: in 
this case cooperation is widespread. Stable cooperation also emerges between these two types of 
agents. Even if  the period in which  they change their  strategy (from  defection to cooperation) 
differs due to the differences in the utility functions, in the long run the Partial Altruist has to 
engage  in  a  longer  period  of  mutual  defection  in  order  to  allow  the  social  openness  of  the 
Benthamite altruist to be sufficiently high to bring about a change in the latter’s strategies towards 
Partial Altruists. It is also interesting to notice that those two types of agent systematically adopt a 
cooperation strategy towards all the other types of agents. These ‘cooperation attempts’ do not 
succeed  in  building  a  stable  relation  based  on  cooperation  because  they  never  match  another 
cooperation strategies from the opponents. Therefore, IR and W decrease due to the difference in 
behavior, and in the following period Partial Altruists and Benthamite Altruists will defect again. 14
This difference in behavior is reflected in the fact that the relational intensities of these two types 
with respect to the other four types of agents are almost zero all along the game.
Figure  2. Evolution of the average of the Relational Intensity parameters (IR)
Result 2. A cyclical behavior characterizes Inequity Loving Egoists
The case of Inequity Loving Egoists is very interesting: among them they cyclically play  
mutual defection, which is followed by a period of mutual cooperation. Due to the symmetry of the 
strategy among them, the values of IR and W increase (See figures 2 and 3). This happens because  
(for sufficiently high values of IR and W) they reach a point in which changing strategy gives them 
a higher utility than the previous strategy, due to the fact that, in addiction to their own monetary 
payoff, they also maximize the absolute value of differences in payoffs. Inequity Loving Egoists 
also adopt a cyclical strategy against all the other types of agents: more specifically, they always 
choose the opposite strategy, compared to the one previously played by their opponent. Let us note 
(Figure 2) that in this case their IR with respect to the other types of opponents is always close to 
zero, right for the reason that they never coincide in the strategies. 
With regard to Spiteful Egoists, independently of the values of relational intensities, social 
openness and the type of opponent, they never cooperate as a response to cooperation. Also due to 
the fact that they positively weight social distance only when the opponent are worse off (this 15
differs  from  Inequity  Loving  Egoists  that  appreciate  social  differences  independently  of who 
obtains the worse result) they never cooperate against defection. Their IR is basically zero with 
respect to Partial Altruists, Benthamite Altruists and Inequity Loving Egoists due to the constant 
differences in behavior. On the other side, IR and W constantly increase, on the basis of mutual 
defection, when we consider the interaction among Spiteful Egoists and the one between Spiteful 
Egoist with Rawlsian Altruists and Pure Egoists. In fact it is worthy to notice that those values are 
nearly half of the ones characterizing Partial and Bentimite Altruists, which increase their relational 
intensity towards mutual cooperation (Figure 2).
Figure 3.  Evolution of the average of social openness parameters (W)
Pure Egoists, by definition, always defect and their only positive values of IR increase based 
on mutual defection.
Rawlsian Altruists, among themselves, tend to behave as Spiteful Egoists and Pure Egoists 
do (and the values of W and IR are similar). The reason is as follows: they are never the first to 
cooperate, since for them it is rational do so, only as a response to previous cooperation, therefore 
they cannot succeed in cooperate among them. Notwithstanding this, IR and W increase based on 
mutual defection. On the other hand, due to the fact that they weigh opponents’ payoff when those 
are  less  then  their  own  payoff,  they  cooperate  with  Partial  and  Benthamite  Altruists and  with 
Inequity Loving Egoists, after the period in which those players had cooperated first. But, since the 
periods of cooperation never coincide, cooperation fails to emerge.16
3.3. Evolutionary dynamics and IR-based interactions: an indirect evolutionary approach
Gueth and Kliemt (1998) assert that it is not plausible to take individual preferences as 
exogenous  to  social  interaction;  by  contrast,  preference  formation  should  be  integrated  into 
economic  models.  In  the  same  vein,  as  Tabellini  (2008)  observes,  while  social  sciences  like 
sociology have often discussed the endogenous evolution of values and preferences, economics has 
normally taken individual preferences as given, without focusing on the endogenous evolution of 
preferences,  norms  and  values.  As  he  remarks:  “In  many  social  situations  individuals  behave 
contrary  to  their  immediate  material  self-interest,  not because  of  an  intertemporal  calculus  of 
benefits and costs, but because they have internalized a norm of good conduct” (p. 2). He also 
wonders: “Why do specific values persist in some environments and not in others?” (p. 2). The 
evolutionary  game-theoretic  approach  provides  a  natural  environment  for  the  analysis  of 
‘motivational  ecologies’  where  heterogeneous  players  interact  over  time.  The  idea  of  a 
‘motivational ecology’ stresses the fact that in this context alternative motivational systems act as if 
they were “struggling for survival”, i.e. compete in order to be adopted by the largest possible 
number of players. Within such an environment, it is possible to set up dynamic models of social 
learning describing the evolution of behaviors generated by social interaction processes and explain 
how a specific subset of the original choice set is eventually ‘selected’ in a self-enforcing way by 
the  social  dynamics.  The  theoretical  framework  just  described  is  in  principle  compatible  with 
several different learning mechanisms, as it seems to emerge from the important literature on the 
learning ‘microfoundations’ of evolutionary dynamics. It is worth observing that while the range of 
possible social conventions resulting from the process is determined by the socially established 
choice set (i.e. by the set of motivational structures that players consider as viable alternatives), the 
convention that actually emerges depends entirely on the dynamic interaction of individual choices. 
This compromise may be the basis of a reasonable medium-run modelling approach to the interplay 
of  the  sociologically  and  economically  oriented  components  of  human  action:  people  act  as 
imperfect optimizers, but only within the choice context that is provided by the social and cultural 
environment they are embedded in.
In this light, the new evolutionary assumption that we add to the model and introduce in this 
section is that the agents that obtain the best results are able to replicate themselves more quickly 
than the others and, as a result, can increase their presence within the population. In particular, we 
assume that agents can periodically observe the average monetary payoff of the entire population 
and compare this value with their own average expected monetary payoff. If an agent’s expected 
result is worse than this value, she will change type with a probability proportional to the average 
payoffs obtained by all the types.  Therefore, the higher are the expected payoffs of one type, the 
higher is the probability that the other will mimic his behavior. This mechanism allows for the 
possibility that an agent could remain of the same type since all the average expected payoffs are 
taken into account. It is important to point out that an agent does not compare utilities, but simply 
monetary payoffs: hence, our approach is fully in line with the well-known ‘Indirect Evolutionary 
Approach’ (IEA) pioneered by Gueth and  Yaari (1992).  In the IEA, preferences are treated as 
endogenous to an evolutionary process in which “objective evolutionary success depends on the 
choices made, which in turn depend on subjective preferences. Success feeds back on subjective 
preferences, and so  on” (Gueth  and Kliemt,  1998; p.  377).  In this evolutionary version of  our 
model, we adopt a co-evolutionary approach which may be seen as a variant of the IEA
21, as we 
treat preference formation as a result of a social interaction process in which subjective preferences 
drive choices and both (i) behavioral choices (due to the key mechanism linking behavioral choices, 
relational intensity and degree of social influence) and (ii) monetary payoffs feed back on subjective 
preferences over time. Outcome-based preferences here are endogenous as “human choice behavior 
                                                          
21 Also Janssen (2006) adopts the IEA.17
is not exclusively determined by expectations of future consequences of choice alternatives. (…) 
We are pushed by innate as well as acquired dispositions and at the same time are pulled by future 
directed  expectations  and  desires,  which  result  in  corresponding  intentions.  (…)  an  indirect 
evolutionary  approach  along  with  preference  formation  can  simultaneously  incorporate  both 
‘dispositional push’ and ‘expectational pull’” (Gueth and Kliemt, 1998; p. 378 and 380).  In this 
paper we stick to a similar approach: ‘phenotypes’ interact in pairs and play a material PD and, 
when doing so, they act ‘rationally’ on the basis of their subjective preferences. In other words, in 
pairwise  matchings  their  choices  are  driven  by  the  ‘expectational  pull’:  rationality  is  forward-
looking and drives choices, on the basis of a lucid calculus of expected material consequences. At 
this micro level (single rounds of play involving two agents at a time), rationality plays a key role: 
individuals are consequentialistically oriented, preferences can be reasonably taken as given and 
purely  preference-based  behavior  occurs
22.  However,  as  time  unfolds  the  above  described  co-
evolutionary process goes on and also the ‘dispositional push’ needs to be taken into account, as 
preferences themselves are supposed to gradually evolve, due to both (i) the mechanism linking 
behavior, relational intensity and degree of social influence and (ii) material success. Hence, on the 
whole  our  co-evolutionary  model,  like  the  IEA,  incorporates  both  ‘dispositional  push’  and 
‘expectational pull’: while the latter drives choices in each matching, the former makes the ‘engine’ 
of  choices  (that  is,  subjective  preferences)  endogenous  to  social  interaction.  Regarding  the 
‘evolutionary engine’ being at work within our framework, it is worth trying to understand whether 
it  is  true  or  not  that,  since  material  consequences  are  supposed  to  play  a  key  role,  selective 
incentives actually play against individuals who pay attention to other people’s well-being and that, 
as a consequence, these motivational types should sooner or later die out in any specific socio-
economic environment. Unlike the prediction underlying such ‘naïve evolutionary view’, we show 
that  selective  incentives  need  not  always  favor  self-interested  individuals  at  the  expenses  of 
nonselfish ones. 
We explore this by also supposing that for each player the probability of being matched with 
another  player  positively  depends  on  the  degree  of  relational  intensity  characterizing  their 
interactions. This assumption appears plausible and gives us the chance to observe the presence of 
clusters within the overall population. Specifically, we assume that the probability with which the 
agents are matched is proportional to the degree of relational intensity IR that an agent experiences 
with her opponents, according to the following formula:
          
(12)  pij= IRij /  j
ij IR
This  seems  a  reasonable  assumption  that  captures  the  idea  that  agents  prefer  to  interact  with 
opponents that showed similarity in behavior, which is the key determinant of increases in relational 
intensity. We can think of this relationship between matching probabilities and IR as a mechanism 
due to which behavioral differences are ‘punished’. However, it is important to emphasize that such 
mechanism is not ex ante biased in favor of cooperation and against defection, as it implies that, in 
the presence of mutual defection (and not only of mutual cooperation), IR increases and so does the 
matching probability. In a similar vein, Eshel, Sansone and Shaked (1999) set up a model in which 
agents exclusively interact with a small subset of the overall population (i.e. with their neighbors 
only) and in this framework they are able to show that if a strategy is ‘unbeatable’ (that is, robust 
against the possible invasion of a finite group of identical mutants), then such a strategy is unique 
and is given by altruism (namely, agents turn out to behave as if they were related to their neighbors 
and take into account their welfare as well as their own payoffs). In particular, they find that the 
                                                          
22 Hence, as Gueth and Kliemt correctly remark, within each round conventional game theory can be fruitfully applied 
in order to predict the results of social interaction.18
degree  of  altruism  depends  on  the  ratio  between  the  radii  of  the  interacting  and  the  learning 
neighborhoods.
3.2. Major results: nice guys finish first 
In this subsection, we summarize our major results, with regard to the evolution of player types and 
the dynamics of material payoffs (Result 3), the creation of significant interpersonal relationships 
(Result 4) and the frequency of cooperation (Result 5) within the final population emerging from 
the simulatory analysis carried out along the lines clarified above. Once again we forced an equal 
number of the six types of the initial population. Results hold also in the random population cases.
              
Figure 4. The evolution of player types
Result 3. Egoists disappear (Inequity Loving Egoists disappear first, followed by Pure Egoists and, 
subsequently, by Spiteful Egoists) first
With  very  strong regularity,  a  sequence  occurs in  which the three types  of  egoists  will 
disappear within the population: the Inequity Loving Egoists are always the first to change their 
type, because of their behavior: as a result of their decision to always make the opposite strategic 
choice compared to that of their opponents at the beginning of the game, when everyone defects, 19
they will get an expected payoff which is always less then one. This does not happen to altruists, 
because they can gain from cooperating among themselves. The second type of selfish players who  
disappear is give by Pure Egoists. Even if they gain from exploiting the behavior of the altruists, the 
assumption  concerning  the  non-random  nature  of  matchings  makes  the  interactions  with  them 
relatively rare. Hence, they end up always defecting against the other types of egoists. Later this 
happens  also  to  Spiteful  Egoists,  but  they  can  survive  longer  because  they  tend  to  play 
cooperatively more often than the other egoists do. 
Further, if we look more closely to the final composition of the population, we notice that, 
whereas  Benthamite  and  Rawlsian  Altruists  are  always  present  when  cooperation  spreads  over 
within the entire population, Partial Altruists are not always present. We see that roughly in one 
case out of three Benthamite and Rawlsian Altruists are the only player types that remain in the 
game. This is due to the fact that Partial Altruists are the ones who will cooperate first with all the 
agents and, at the beginning of the game, they will never gain by making this behavioral choice. 
Insofar  as  there  is  not  a  sufficiently  large  number  of  Partial  Altruists  around  (among  which 
cooperation could flourish), the results that such players obtain are clearly worse than the ones 
obtained by all of their opponents opting for defection against them. However, regardless of the 
presence of two or three types of altruistic individuals in the final population, cooperation turns out 
to be the only strategic choice that survives, leading to an equal average payoff (corresponding to 
the (C,C) equilibrium) among altruists (see Figure 5). 
Figure 5. The dynamics of average material payoffs (Egoists disappear)20
By analyzing the dynamics of interpersonal relationships, we find extremely robust results. Altruists 
generate very strong relationships among themselves through cooperation. In fact, as time unfolds, 
the only positive values of IR (Figure 6) are the ones among the three types of Altruists, with the 
only exception of the Relational Intensity among Rawlsian Altruists, who, as we explained in the 
previous paragraph, are not able to cooperate among them. Moreover, it is important to notice that, 
due to the fact that the matching probabilities depend on the values of IR, Rawlsian Altruists have 
almost zero probability of interacting among them, due to the fact that their Relational Intensity 
remains very low. In the long run they establish stable mutual cooperation only with the other two 
types of Altruists (Figure 7).  This can be summarized as follows:
Result 4. As time unfolds, altruists establish increasingly strong relationships among themselves, 
based on mutual cooperation
        
                
Figure 6. Dynamics of average IR among types
This results in roughly double values of relational intensities compared to the case of egoists who 
strengthen their relationship on the basis of defection. If we look at Figure 3, these dynamics are 
very clear. Here we reported the average levels of relational intensity (IR) among groups, where the 
types are ordered in the same way as the results concerning the homogeneous types. For example, 
the first row of graphs summarizes the evolution of the average level of IR of Partial Altruists with 
respect to themselves, Benthamite Altruists, Inequity Loving Egoists, Spiteful Egoists, Rawlsian 21
Altruists and  Pure  Egoists.  Hence,  it  is straightforward  to  notice that  the levels  of  IR become 
increasingly large in the first, second and fifth graph in rows 1, 2 and 5, that is with regard to the 
three types of altruists present within the overall heterogeneous population.
                         
Figure 7. The frequency of cooperation
           Finally, in Figure 7 we report the frequency of cooperation among the agents that survive.
Here, a dot represents the cooperative strategic choice of the agent ‘row’ with respect to agents 
‘column’. As we pointed out before, cooperation is the only ‘active’ strategic choice within the final 
population (as it is evident from observing the average payoff, which is equal to two). The empty
spaces (which strictly speaking indicate defection), here can be interpreted as the agent’s 
relationships that are ‘inactive’, in the sense that defection is still the best strategic choice against 
agents with whom the probability to be matched is close to zero. The results concerning the 
evolution of player types and the dynamics of material payoffs captured by figures 5 and 7 can be 
summarized as follows:
Result 5. Within the final population, cooperation is the unique strategic choice played within the 
social network 22
4. Concluding remarks 
In Sections 2, 3.1. and 3.2. we have illustrated a model where different types of individuals 
are connected in a circular way: in the short run, in pairwise matchings, maximization of utility 
functions drives the behavior of agents that has, not only (direct) consequences in terms of material 
payoffs, but also (indirect) consequences – through players’ behavioral choices – on the degree of 
relational intensity IR. IR affects the motivational dimension of the subjects through the parameter 
of sociality. Hence, the model underlies a co-evolutionary approach based on the interplays among 
motivational, behavioral and relational level, with regard to both homogeneous and heterogeneous 
populations. In Section 3.3. we retain this basic framework but we add two key assumptions, with 
regard to evolutionary dynamics: by adopting a variant of the indirect evolutionary approach, we 
suppose  that  material  payoffs  play  a  critical  role  in  driving  the  long-run  evolution  of  types. 
Moreover, we assume that here IR affects not only players’ utility functions (via the degree of 
social influence) but also the probability with which the agents are matched.
The simulations we carried out within such more complex evolutionary environment led to 
strongly  consistent  results  with  regard  to  both  the  evolution of  the  types  and  the  creation  of 
significant relations among agents. In the long run, cooperation turns out to be the strategic choice 
that obtains the best results, in terms of material payoffs: as a consequence, the large majority of the 
populations we analyzed is composed of altruists only (this regards more than 95% of the cases). 
Hence, nice guys, far from finishing last, prevail and dominate within the final population, where 
they establish significant interpersonal relationships among themselves. More specifically, unlike 
the case previously analyzed and discussed, Rawlsian altruists are now also able to adopt their 
preferred behavior (cooperation) in a stable way and they succeed in generating extremely strong 
relationships with the other two types of altruists (see Figure 1 above). It is important to emphasize 
that  there  we  reported  the results  of  a  single  simulation  capturing the  majority  of  our  general 
results
23. In the remaining cases (5%), the final population consists, with equal probability, of the 
three types of egoists and the only strategic choice that emerges in the population is defection. 
However, this result is mainly due to the fact that, within the initial population, very few altruists 
(of all the kinds) were present and, at the beginning of the game, they obtained very bad results due 
to the low number of agents with whom they could cooperate. Thus, their altruistic behavior has 
been fully exploited by their opponents.
                                                          
23 The results of the other simulations not reported here are available upon request. 23
References
Alexander, S., 1974. Social evaluation. Quarterly Journal of Economics 88. 597-624.
Andreoni, J., Miller, J., 2002. Giving according to GARP: an experimental test of the consistency of 
preferences for altruism. Econometrica 70, 737-753. 
Axelrod, R., 1984. The emergence of cooperation among egoists. The American Political Science 
Review 75.
Batson, C.D.,  1987.  Prosocial  Motivation:  Is  It  Ever  Truly  Altruistic?  In  L.  Berkowitz  (Ed.) 
Advances in experimental social psychology, 20, Academic Press, New York.
Benchekroun,  H.,  Van  Long,  N.,  2007.  The  build-up  of  cooperative  behavior  among  non-
cooperative selfish agents. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. Forthcoming.
Bolton,  G.,  Ockenfels,  A.,  2000.  A  theory  of  equity,  reciprocity  and  competition.  American 
Economic Review 100, 166-193.
Camerer, C., 2003. Behavioral Game Theory. Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Charness,  G.,  Rabin,  M.,  2002.  Understanding  social  preferences  with  simple  tests.  Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 117, 817-869.
Edgeworth, F.Y., 1881. Mathematical Psychics, Kegan Paul and Co., London.
Erlei,  M.,  2006.  Heterogeneous  social  preferences.  Journal  of  Economic  Behavior  and 
Organization, forthcoming.
Eysenck, M.W., 2000. Psychology. A Student’s Handbook, Psychology Press, Hove, East Sussex.
Eshel,  I.,  Sansone,  E.,  Shaked,  A.,  1999.  The  emergence  of  kinship  behavior  in  structured 
populations of unrelated individuals. International Journal of Game Theory 28, 447-463.
Falk, A., Fischbacher, U., 2006. A theory of reciprocity. Games and Economic Behavior 54, 293-
315.
Fehr, E., Fischbacher, U., Kosfeld, M., 2005. Neuroeconomic foundations of trust and social 
preferences. American Economic Review 95, 2, 346-351. 
Fehr E., Schmidt K., 1999. A theory of fairness, competition and co-operation. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 114, 817-868.
Fehr, E., Gaechter, S., 2000. Cooperation and punishment. American Economic Review 90, 4, 980-
94. 
Gintis, H., Smith, E., Bowles, S., 2001. Cooperation and costly signalling, Journal of Theoretical 
Biology 213,  103-119. 24
Güth, W., Yaari, M., 1992. Explaining Reciprocal Behavior in Simple Strategic Games: an 
Evolutionary Approach, in Witt U. (ed.), Explaining Process and Change: Approaches to 
Evolutionary Economics, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 23-34. 
Hamilton, W.D., 1964. The genetical evolution of social behavior. Journal of Theoretical Biology 7, 
1-16. 
Hoffman M.L., 1995, Personality Processes and Individual Differences - Is Altruism Part of Human 
Nature?, in Zamagni S.(a cura di), 1995.
Janssen  M.A..  2006,  Evolution  of  cooperation  in  a  one-shot  prisoner’s  dilemma  based  on 
recognition  of  trustworthy  and  untrustworthy  agents.  Journal  of  Economic  Behavior  and 
Organization. Forthcoming.
Li,  J.,  2006.  The  power  of  conventions:  A  theory  of  social  preferences.  Journal  of  Economic 
Behavior and Organization. Forthcoming.
Mueller  D.,  1986,  Rational  Egoism  versus  Adaptive  Egoism  as  Fundamental  Postulate  for  a 
Descriptive Theory of Human Behavior, Public Choice, 51, 3.
Nowak, M.A., Sigmund, K., 1998. Evolution of indirect reciprocity by image scoring. Nature 393, 
573-77. 
Rabin,  M.,  1993.  Incorporating fairness  into  game  theory and  economics.  American  Economic 
Review 83, 1281-1302.
Rotemberg,  J.J.,  2007.  Minimally  acceptable  altruism  and  the  ultimatum  game.  Journal  of 
Economic Behavior and Organization. Forthcoming.
Rubinstein, A., 1986. Finite automata play the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma. Journal of Economic 
Theory 39, 83-96.
Singer, T., Fehr, E., 2005. The neuroeconomics of mind reading and empathy. American Economic 
Review 95, 2, 340-345. 
Smith A., 1759, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, (ed.) Stewart D., Bell and Sons, 1892, New 
York.
Stahl, D.O., Haruvy, E., 2006. Other-regarding preferences: Egalitarian warm glow, empathy, and 
group size. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 61, 20-41.
Tabellini,  G.,  2008.  The  scope of  cooperation:  values  and  incentives.  Quarterly  Journal  of 
Economics. Forthcoming.
Trivers, R.L., 1971. The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Quarterly Review of Biology 46, 1, 35-57. 
Weibull, J., 1995. Evolutionary Game Theory. MIT Press, Cambridge and London.